Freedom and Servitude

By Duck Brown

In the “Freedom” movement on planet earth, people use the term “freedom” to describe something they want, but what does this term mean? If you ask ten people, you might get ten answers, especially if you approach it by cases, e.g. “is it freedom to say “Fuck Trudeau”?”; “is it freedom to go through a red light?”; “is it freedom to kill someone who is disrupting your child’s education?” I do not propose to address the question from this direction. Instead, I will use ancient legal authorities to answer it.

But first, we should do a little preparatory work on language and its nature, via Aristotle. “Spoken sounds,” says Aristotle, “are symbols of affections in the soul, and written marks symbols of spoken sounds” (16a1). “A name is a spoke sound significant by convention” (16a15). Aristotle says “by convention” because “no name is a name naturally, but only when it has become a symbol. Even inarticulate noises (of beasts, for instance) do indeed reveal something, yet none of them is a name” (16a25).

I would recommend the entirety of On Interpretation from which these quotations are taken to anyone: and remember, the Internet can go out at any time, so it can’t hurt to download it, or to have a hard copy. With this foundation, “freedom,” being a word, is going to refer to an “affection in the soul.” Let us go forward in history to the English Judge Bracton, whose de Legibus et Consuetudinibius Angliae, On the Laws and Customs of England, contains the following definition:

“Freedom is the natural faculty of doing what each person pleases to do according to his will, except what is prohibited to him of right or by force.” (Bracton, Sir Travers Twiss, Q.C., D.C.L., trans. London: 1878, p. 369.)

Because comparing different translations can help us make sense of things, here is a more recent translation:

“Freedom is a man's natural power of doing what he wishes, so far as he is not prevented by law or force. ” (Bracton: Thorne Edition: English. Volume 2, Page 143.)

Thus, we see that “natural faculty” means “natural power,” and we see that “of right” and “by law” mean essentially the same thing. The question then becomes “which law?” Freedom, being a natural power, is quite clearly governed by the law of nature, nature being prior to the State and its laws. How, then, do we, using this vocabulary, describe the state and its laws? Bracton further defines the term Servitude:

“Servitude on the other hand may be said to be the contrary, as if any person contrary to freedom should be bound upon a covenant to do something or not to do it.” (Bracton: Thorne Edition: English. Volume 2, Page 143.)

“Servitude may be said to be the contrary, as where, contrary to [his natural] freedom, he is bound by agreement to do something or not do it.” (Bracton: Thorne Edition: English. Volume 2, Page 143.)

Thus, we see that servitude is contrary to freedom, in the same sense that life is contrary to death, or guilt is contrary to innocence. The Latin for this term that is translated “bound upon a covenant” or “bound by agreement” is teneatur quis ex conventione, which could also be translated “bound by the assembly” or “bound by the meeting,” for those are simply agreements by more than two people. Thus, we see that all acts of Legislatures are servitudes, insofar as they bind someone to do something contrary to natural freedom, that is, the power of doing whatever one wishes, except as forbidden by force or by natural law.

And as in my Article on Allegiance,

“God and nature is one to all, and therefore the law of God and nature is one to all. By this law of nature is the faith, ligeance and obedience of the subject due to his Sovereign or superior.” (7 Co. Rep. 12b-13a)

Thus, finally, we can translate Bracton somewhat less literally to say

“Freedom is the natural power of every person to do as he wishes except as forbidden by God’s law or by force.” Therefore, what the one-in-five people who work for the Corporate Government are doing, when they enforce their “acts” and “bylaws” and “policies” over you is robbing you of your freedom, so that they may, parasitically, make enough money to enjoy the good life.

And is this a fair deal? Is what you get in return a sort of quid pro quo, or perhaps even more than you could expect in exchange for your freedom? No. I apologize that the source I am about to quote is not available publicly, but, none-the-less, here it is:

"freedom is something beyond price and ought not to be left to the decision of ignorant and injudicious men." (Fleta, lib. 2 cap. 51.  Fleta 72 Selden Society 174.)

Therefore, we see that freedom is “beyond price,” and what this means is that anything someone might offer you as the “price” of your freedom is not a fair bargain. They could offer you a hospital bed; they could offer you legal tender; they could offer you any price imaginable, and none of it would, in our law, be a fair compensation for your freedom.

Let us close by quoting a Justice Bereford, of the Common Pleas:

“Bereford JCP: Law is more predisposed to save and maintain one in his free estate than to condemn him or put him into servitude (version IV); since you (plaintiff) say that he (defendant) is your villein and he says that he is free the law works in his favour, etc. for it is quite clear that he remains free until you can prove the contrary by
his blood.” (0 Hen. 3 Norfolk 1 (fol. 122 SS 24-33))

Thus, anyone claiming you are not free (the particular word for this does not matter: it could be villein, or serf, or they might just behave as though you are not free without ascribing a term to your status) must prove it.

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Originally Posted Here: Duck Brown’s Substack